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PROTECTION OF NON-ENEMY INTERESTS IN
ENEMY EXTERNAL ASSETS*
ELY MAURERt
SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM
The Allied countries which took part in World War II have engaged in the
blocking and seizure of the external assets of enemy countries. In so doing they
have been motivated generally by three objectives.1 The first objective was that of
economic warfare: to prevent the enemy from utilizing any of his assets abroad in
furtherance of the enemy war effort and to put the assets to use in furtherance of
the Allied war effort. Normally blocking controls were adequate to debar any
enemy use, while seizure was necessary for putting the assets to Allied use. The
second objective was that of security: to eliminate economic penetration in certain key
industries located in Allied territory and to deprive the enemy of the foreign assets
which might provide the sinews for a future war. The third objective was that of
reparations: to obtain some compensation for the Allies and their nationals for
the oftentimes incalculable losses of war.
With the passage of time, the importance of these objectives has changed. When
the war ended, economic warfare became no longer applicable. Security measures
with relation to enemy external assets loomed small in comparison with security
measures to be taken inside the enemy countries and by way of alliances among the
victors, especially in view of the emergence of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites as the
dominant threat to peace. As for the reparation objective, that still has meaning since
countries look to this source to indemnify themselves of their nationals for war
losses, especially since there has been a dwindling away of other forms of reparations
and the elimination of other avenues for the satisfaction of claims.2
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer, and not necessarily those of the
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in this article, the United States Treaties and other International Act Series will be referred to as
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f B.A. 1933, New York University; LL.B. 1936, Columbia University. Assistant to the Legal Adviser,
Department of State, concerned with enemy property matters. Department of State representative at
international conferences on intercustodial problems.
2 Clayton, Security Against Renewed German Aggression, 13 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 12 (1945); Bishop,
Judidal Construction of the Trading With the Enemy Act, 62 HARv. L. Rav. 721, 722, 742-743 (1949);
Rubin, Allied-Swedish Accord on German External Assets, Looted Gold and Other Related Matters, 17
DEP"'r STATE BuLL. 155, x57, x61 (1947).
The United States has not as yet seized the Bulgarian, Hungarian, or Rumanian assets in its juris-
diction as it is entitled to under the Peace Treaties. In view of the failure of thee countries to provide
compensation to American claimants for war damage it may be necessary to resort to these assets for
satisfaction of these claims. With respect to Japan and Germany, where the United States bears the
dominant role of supporting their economies, there is a less clear advantage to it in the program of
seizure of these countries' external assets. The proceeds of such assets are presently earmarked for the
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The amount of enemy external assets subject to seizure is large and embraces
the following types: German, Japanese, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Rumanian, and
Italian.3 In addition, there are some special provisions concerning certain Austrian
external assets. The picture of the seizures of the various types is as follows:
(i). German. The Allies during and since the war have proceeded under their
internal legislation to seize German assets in their jurisdiction.4 Under the Potsdam
Agreement5 of August 1, 1945 the U.S.S.R. was to secure the appropriate German
external assets in Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Finland, and Eastern Austria while
the Allies were entitled to the assets elsewhere in the world. Accordingly, the
U.S.S.R. secured in the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and
Finland6 the recognition of its title to all German assets in these countries trans-
ferred by the Control Council for Germany. Further the U.S.S.R. appears prepared
in the Treaty with Austria, which is still under negotiation, to turn over the German
assets in the Eastern Zone of Austria to Austria for liquidation as against compensa-
tion and certain special rights as to former German oil lands.7 On the other hand,
the United States, United Kingdom, and France were confirmed in their authority by
the Peace Treaty with Italy to dispose of German assets in Italy,' and have made a
memorandum of understanding with Italy for the liquidation of those assets;0 they are
taking action to liquidate German assets in Japan;"° and they are prepared to turn
over German assets in the Western Zone of Austria to the Austrians for liquidation."
satisfaction of certain war claims. War Claims Act, 62 STAT. 1247 (1948), 50 U. S. C. App. §2012
(Supp. 1950).
The amount of reparations from Germany and Japan by way of removals of industrial equipment
has been reduced considerably from original estimates, thus disappointing countries which were looking
to this source for the partial satisfaction of their claims. See, e.g., on the German picture, REPORT or mTE
SECRSETARY GENERAL FOR 1949, INTER-ALLIED REPARATION AGENCY 11-12 (1950).
' Although Finland engaged in the war on the side of Germany, provision was made for the restoration
of her external assets. Finnish Treaty, Art. 27. See generally, Martin, The Treatment of Enemy Prop-
erty under the Peace Treaties of 1947, 34 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY FOR TilE YEAR 1948
77 (r949) (article brought up to date of publication).
'See generally, MARTIN DoMKE, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY IN WORLD WAR II (1943); and its
supplement, THE CONTROL OF ALIEu PROPERTY (T947); and symposium, Enemy Property, I1 LAw &
CONrENI. PROB. (1945).
. Art. III, pars. 5-3, 8, 9. The text of the Potsdam Agreement is contained in Dep't State Press
Release No. 238, March 24, 1947.
'Bulgarian Treaty, Art. 24; Hungarian Treaty, Art. 28; Rumanian Treaty, Act. 26; Finnish Treaty,
Art. 26.
"Mosely, The Treaty With Austria, 4 INT'L ORG. 219, 230-231 (1950). The discussions of the
Western Powers with the U.S.S.R. on the unresolved issues of the Treaty have practically come to a
standstill, the Soviet Government apparently not being willing to conclude the Treaty. See Mosely, supra,
at 219.
gItalian Treaty, Art. 77, par. 5.
'Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States, France, United Kingdom, and Italy
on German Assets in Italy of August 14, 1947, T.I.A.S. 1664.
-. 10 The liquidation is being done by the occupation authorities in Japan, assisted by an advisory com-
mittee composed of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and France. See REPORT OF -nip
VAR CLAIMs CommIssION, H. k. Doc. No. 580, 8ist Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1950).
" See, e.g., United States Renunciation of German Assets in Austria, x5 DEP'T STATE BULL. t23
(1946). The Austrians are at present administering these assets as trustee for the United States in the
United States zone in Austria.
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Further, under the Paris Reparation Agreement of January 14, 1946 the i8 govern-
ments signatory to it, while committing themselves to liquidate German assets in
their jurisdictions," empowered the United States, United Kingdom, and France
to make agreements with the neutral countries for the liquidation of the German
assets within these countries.' 3 Pursuant to this mandate agreements were reached
with Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, and Portugal.'
4
(2). Japanese. The Allies during and since the war have blocked and seized
Japanese external assets under their internal legislation.' 5 The United States an-
nounced that it favors the inclusion of a clause in the Peace Treaty with Japan
authorizing the retention of Japanese external assets. 6
(3)- Italian. By the Peace Treaty with Italy countries which were at war with
Italy are entitled to seize Italian assets in their territory' 7 and the U.S.S.R. by a
special provision became entitled to Italian assets in Bulgaria, Hungary, and
Rumania.' 8
(4). Bulgarian, Hungarian, Rumanian. By the Peace Treaties countries which
were at war with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, are entitled to seize the external
assets of these countries?
(5). Austrian. By reason of the special status of Austria as a victim rather than
ally of Germany, no provision is expected to be contained in the Treaty with Austria
regarding its external assets, with two exceptions: Yugoslavia will be permitted.to
retain Austrian assets in its territory and the U.S.S.R., as part compensation for
the surrender of German assets in the Eastern Zone of Austria, will receive the
assets in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania of the Danube Shipping Company, a
corporation organized under Austrian law. °
The widespread seizure of enemy external assets has given rise to serious problems
12 Pt. I, Art. 6A, T.I.A.S. 1655. The text and a comment on the Paris Reparation Agreement are
contained in Howard, The Paris Agreement on Reparation from Germany (DEP'T STATE PUB. No. 2584).
Pakistan became the 19 th signatory after its split from India.
13 Pt. I, Art. 6c.
a' Allied-Swiss Accord of May 25, 1946, 14 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1121 (946); Allied-Swedish Accord
of July z8, z946, T.I.A.S. 1657, 1731; Allied-Spanish Accord of May so, 1948, T.I.A.S. 1773. The
Allied-Portuguese Accord has not become fully binding because of an outstanding gold problem, and
has not been published. Liquidation is, however, proceeding under Portuguese Decree Law No. 37, 377
of April 21, 1949. See also comments in German Assets in Switzerland, 14 DEP'T STATE BULL. 5I1O
(1946); Rubin, Allied-Swedish Accord on German External Assets, Looted Gold, and Other Related
Matters, 17 DEP'T STATE BULL. 155 (1947); Mann, German Property in Switzerland, 23 BRiT. Y. B.
INT'L L. 354 (1946).
', See note 4 snpra.
sDep't State Press Release No. ai8o, Nov. 24, 1950.
" Art. 79. The United States has voluntarily agreed to release the considerable Italian assets in the
United States. Memorandum of Understanding of August 14, 1947, Between the United States and
Italy on Italian Assets in the United States and Certain Claims of United States Nationals, T.I.A.S. 1757,
at 30.
"o Art. 74, Pt. A, par. 2b.
"' Bulgarian Treaty, Art. 25; Hungarian Treaty, Art. 29; Rumanian Treaty, Art. 27.
"' Mosely, supra note 7, at 225, 231.
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concerning the protection of the economic interests of non-enemies, 21 since enmeshed
and intermingled in these enemy assets are substantial values in assets, or interests in
assets, belonging in an economic sense directly, indirectly, or beneficially to non-
enemies. Thus, the vesting action of Allied authorities has in numerous instances
had the curious result of bringing harm to other Allied nationals and giving rise
to a war claim. Of course where the non-enemy interest is a direct legal ownership
right in the property seized, the remedial provisions of most custodial legislation
will permit adequate legal redress. Where, however, the economic interest does not
represent such a direct ownership right, solutions on an international level must be
found even though such solutions in certain instances might be inconsistent with
municipal principles of ownership. For the United States the problem of the pro-
tection of non-enemy interests in enemy property is especially important. This
derives from the exceedingly large investment of American nationals abroad
and from the tieup of immigrant classes in the United States with areas of origin 2
II
NoN-ENEmY
At the threshhold of the problem of protecting non-enemy interests is the ques-
tion of what individuals or enterprises are to be considered non-enemy. In the
midst of war, the broadest definitions have been employed of enemy so as to prevent
any loopholes.28  These definitions were based on combinations of factors such as
citizenship or nationality, territory in which located, activity in which engaged,
persons by whom controlled, etc. Since the war the definitions have been narrowed.
Without attempting to be exhaustive, some of the interesting and instructive cases
in this field can be touched upon.
A. Friendly National and Dual National in Enemy Territory
An Australian who spent the war in the heart of Australia, engaging in no
action hostile to the Allied cause, is the typical case of a non-enemy. A Frenchman
residing during the war in French territory occupied by the Germans and engaging
21 These problems, of course, would not exist if all enemy property were freed as has been urged
by some writers. Borchard, The Treatment of Enemy Property, 34 GEo. L. J. 389 (1946); Sommerich,
A Brief .4gainst Confiscation, xr LAW & CoNTEmP. PROB. 153 (1945). But there appears to be
justification for such seizures. Rubin, "Inviolability" of Enemy Private Property, ii LAW & CONvrssP.
POE. 166 (1945), especially if claims against the enemy state or nationals are to be paid from the
proceeds of the seized property, 3 C. C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1736-1737 (2d. ed. 1947); AMERICAN
BAt AssocirA=oN, REPoir op COMMrrrEE ON ADJUDicATioN OF WAR CLAIMS 35 (I945).
2-According to the census taken by the Treasury in 1943, individuals and organizations in the
United States reported ownership of x3 x/2 billion dollars in assets abroad. Of the 215,ooo reporters,
z68,ooo were individuals, 27,ooo of these-were foreign citizens, and 2/3 of these later had come into the
country after 1937. Individuals owned the large sum of 3 x/2 billion. Foreword, CENsus op AMERICAN
OWNED AssFTs IN FOREION CoumnuEs (U. S. TREASURY DEP'T, 1947). No figures exist of how much
property owned by individuals and organizations in the United States is involved in enemy property
seizures.
23 DoME, op. cit. supra note 4, cc. 3, 9, 10, 1I. See generally on enemy character, with emphasis
on British practice. Cohn, German Enemy Property-I, 3 INr'L L. Q. 530 (195o).
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in no action hostile to the Allied cause is another case entitled to protection?4 But
what about the British citizen who lived in Germany before the war, and remained
there during the war because he had difficulty in getting out, was sick, or had his
business in Germany, etc. A strict view can be taken that unless he was involuntarily
in Germany he should be considered as having thrown in his lot with the enemy and
to be treated as such. 5 Another view looks merely to the Allied citizenship and
exempts any of his external assets.2 6 A country taking the strict view may still make
an exception for its own citizens living in enemy territory2 7 When we come to the
case of the dual national, having one enemy nationality, and residing in enemy
territory, countries generally seize, relying on the indubitable enemy nationality,
28
although here too domestic considerations may lead countries to give favorable
status to their own citizen who also has enemy nationality2 9
B. Bestowal of Enemy Citizenship
With relation to the important question of citizenship, what effect shall be given
to the bestowal of enemy citizenship on populations or groups that had been taken
over by the enemy? Examples of this process took place by German action in
Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Danzig, Poland, Alsace
Lorraine, and in the Baltic States.30 No question seems to exist with relation to
Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Danzig, Poland, and Alsace Lorraine.
The laws changing the citizenship of their populations have been disregarded and
assets of their nationals released as non-enemy. This has been done even though
"' In some cases he may find his property vested. Thus the United States seized patents of citizens of
France during the war if they were in enemy-occupied territory. These patents are now being returned.
Procedures for return of such vested property have been agreed upon with most European countries. See
OFFICE OF ALEN PRoPERTY, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE, 1947 84 (947); see Alk
and Moskovitz, Removal of United States Controls Over Foreign-Owned Property, so FED. B. J. 3, 28, and
n. 41 (1948).
" Thus §32(a) (2) (C) of the United States Trading With the Enemy Act, 6, STAT. 785, 50 U. S. C.
App. §32 (Supp. xg5o). A broad claim has been made that paragraph 6 of Art. 79 of the Italian Treaty
(and similar provisions in other treaties) authorizes the seizure of property of any person resident in
Italy since such a person's property was "subject to control" during the war. Martin, Private Property,
Rights, and Interests in the Paris Peace Treaties, 24 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 273, 293 (x947). This ignores
the fact that paragraph 6 talks of "Italian property" subject to control. Of course an Allied power might
seize such a person's property if it could justify such seizure under international law as against the
country of the person's nationality.
" Thus the Allied Accords with the neutrals are limited to persons of German nationality: Allied-Swiss
Accord, Art. I(i), Annex, Art. IV(B), 14 DEas" STATE BULL. 1121, 1124 (1946); Allied-Swedish Accord,
T.I.A.S. x657, p. 17; Allied Spanish Accord, Art. III, T.I.A.S. 1773, p. 4.
"'See sec. 32(a) (") (c) referred to in note 25, supra.
" Thus Switzerland and the United States at present seize the property of such dual nationals. Rule
6G of the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency, Rules of Accounting for German External Assets (1947) has
a limited exception for a person who is expected to leave Germany and was formerly a resident of an
Allied country.
" Thus a recent amendment permits returns to such American citizens, and even to certain women
who became Germans by marriage and lost their American citizenship. Pub. L. No. 859, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (Sept. 29, ig5o). A provision in the Allied-Swiss Accord calls for sympathetic consideration for
property of Swiss origin belonging to women of Swiss birth married to Germans and residing in Germany,
Annex, Art. I (A)(e), 14 DEa'T STATE BuLL. 1121, 1122 (1946).
"See RAPHAEL LEMKtN, Axis RIILE IN Occurs'an Eu r oP 13-14 (1944). See Cohn, supra note 23,
at 531-537.
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some of the inhabitants of these areas doubtless welcomed German citizenship. t
A more difficult problem has been posed by the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia,
who were, rather indiscriminately, expelled after the war from Czechoslovakia into
Germany. It will be recalled that the Sudeten Germans generally welcomed Hitler
and German citizenship. Furthermore, in expelling them from Czechoslovakia, the
Czech Government deprived them of Czech citizenship. Notwithstanding this, the
Czech Government has insisted on its right to the assets of these individuals abroad
and has attempted to prevent other countries from seizing these assets as German. 2
From the standpoint of the individuals concerned, some could make a good case that
they never voluntarily accepted German citizenship nor wanted German domicile
and that in fact they were anti-Nazi. These may charge that they should not be
considered as German nationals and that it is in violation of democratic tenets to give
any recognition to imposition of citizenship by the German Government.83
With respect to the Baltic States, the United States has continued its blocking
controls over the assets of nationals of these countries in the United States, not recog-
nizing the absorption of these countries by the U.S.S.R. For those nationals of so,
called "ethnic" German stock upon whom the German Government after its con-
quest of these areas attempted to impose German citizenship, the precedent of the
action taken with respect to Alsace Lorraine and Austria appears relevant. In the
event that certain of these individuals may have voluntarily accepted German citi-
zenship and withdrawn back to Germany before the advancing Russians, a case
would be posed where seizure of property would appear to be legitimate.34
C. Inhabitants of Territories Separated from the Enemy
In addition to the problem of territories that had been absorbed by enemy coun-
at In some of these cases the property may be withheld because the owners may be guilty of collabora-
tion. It should be noted that the United States Treasury exchanged letters of assurances which permitted
countries to certify and secure the release of even the property of their collaborators, the theory being
that these countries would deal with their own traitors best. However, the Office of Alien Property con-
strues the Trading With the Enemy Act, under which it grants releases of vested property, to preclude
return" to collaborators.
"
2In the Paris Reparation Agreement of January 24, 1946, T.I.A.S. 1655, the Czech Government
secured a clause (Part I, Art. 6D) which enabled it to seize the assets of these people without accounting
for them as German assets. In the later working out of the accounting rules, the question arose as to
the right of other countries to seize assets of Sudeten Germans in their jurisdiction. No solution was
reached and the question was left without prejudice to the opposing views to be settled where necessary
by bilateral governmental discussions. Thus Rule 7 of the Rules of Accounting for German External
Assets, Inter-Allied Reparation Agency (1947) excludes from assets to be accounted for the assets of
individuals who were nationals of an Allied country and not a national of Germany before the war.
See, also, Simsarian, Rules for Accounting for German Assets in Countries Members of the Inter-Allied
Reparation Agency, 18 DEP'T STATE BULL. 227, 229 (1948); and Commentary on the Rules contained
in Inter-Allied Reparation Agency Document, I.A.R.A./AS/ Doc. 354 of Nov. 18, x947.
"In cases arising in United States courts involving acquisition of German citizenship by residents in
the United States who were citizens of absorbed areas, the courts have refused to place the acquisition of
citizenship on the fiat of the German Government, but instead have based it on evidence of voluntary
acceptance. U. S. ex rel. Reichel v. Carusi, 157 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U. S.
842 (Czech); United States cx rel. Schwarzkopf v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. X943) (Austrian); United
States ex. rel. D'Esquiva v. Uhl, 137 F. 2d 903 (2d Cir. 1943) (Austrian); Zeller v. Watkins, 167 F. 2d
279 (2d Cir. 1948) (Danziger).
14 See note 33, supra.
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tries in their aggressive action preceding and during World War II, the question
arises as to areas formerly part of the original boundaries of the enemy and now
separated therefrom. There would seem little difficulty in principle in seizing the
external35 assets of Saarlanders, despite the economic union of the Saar and France,
although the French have not been averse to claiming immunity from seizure of
the assets elsewhere of Saarlanders. Seizure is more justified with relation to cases
where the citizens of the former German territories, as, for example, East Prussia,
now under interim Polish and the U.S.S.R. administration, were shipped into the
new, constricted German territories. A different problem is raised with respect to
inhabitants of former enemy possessions now freed, involving subject populations,
for example, Korea and Manchuria. It would not appear proper to seize the external
assets of these inhabitants as enemy nationals 6 In this connection the Italian Peace
Treaty permitted the seizure of the external assets of Italian nationals who were in
ceded territories and opted to remain Italian, exempting from seizure the assets of
those who took a new citizenship except if those assets were within Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Rumania and thus fell to the U.S.S.R?'
D. Persecutees
Another kind of case, that of persecutees, warrants mention here, although it is
the subject of more extended treatment elsewhere in this symposium. Those who
were victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution on the bases of racial, religious, or
political grounds were treated as enemies by the Axis regimes and it would be a
mockery to seize their assets for reparations purposes. In the case of Jews who left
Germany before 1941, the German Government took away citizenship and made
them stateless? In other cases, however, these victims remained the nationals of
the countries persecuting them. With respect to German external assets, Rule 6F of
the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency Accounting Rules39 permits exemption from
seizure of victims of Nazi persecution who are expected to leave Germany in a
reasonable time. It appears that the British custodian follows the same rule,
mutatis mutandis, in the case of Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Rumanian persecutees.
The United States custodian operates under Section 32(a)(2)(C) and (D) which
" It should be noted that the discussion here is about the external assets of the Saarlanders, etc., and
does not concern the right to seize the property of Saarlanders in the Saar, etc.
" Especially is this so in the case of Manchuria, whose seizure by the Tapanese was generally not
recognized.
a Italian Treaty, Art. 79, par. 6(g).
SB Salwin, Nationality Status of German Refugees, 30 MINN. L. REv. 372, 374 (1945). Some de-
cisions have been rendered in the United Kingdom which reach the curious result that the German
Reich could not denationalize its subjects located abroad by the I94x decree, these decisions thus subjecting
them to the disabilities of German citizens. See Salwin, supra, at 392 n. 6o. For criticism of these
and other decisions, see Lauterpacht, Nationality of Denationalized PersonS, JEWIsH YEARBOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1949).
30 See note 28, supra. Article 5 of the London Patent Accord on German Patents of July 27, 1946,
signed by numerous countries, permits the exemption of patents owned by German refugees. See text,
x5 DEP'T STATE BULL. 300 (1946).
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permits release of the assets of Nazi and Fascist victims wherever resident.40 It
should be pointed out that although articles in the Italian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, and
Rumanian Peace Treaties4' permit the seizure of the external assets of their nationals,
without excluding therefrom Nazi or Fascist victims, these articles should be read
in conjunction (x) with the article in all these Treaties dealing with the restoration
of rights and interests of Allied nationals, which includes therein the rights and
interests of individuals who were treated as enemy,42 and (2) with the special
articles in the Hungarian and Rumanian Treaties which speak of the restoration of
the rights and interests of those who were the objects of racial or religious persecu-
tion.43  It is illogical for the Allies to have required that the assets of these victims
be restored in the country of their nationality, and yet be seized outside such
country. Further, under several agreements on the liquidation of German external
assets, exemptions have been granted to the property of persecutees.
E. Enemy Citizen Resident Outside Enemy Territory
Most countries have exempted from seizure the assets of the Milwaukee German,
that is, the enemy national who has been residing for a long time in the jurisdiction
or in the territory of other friendly countries, has not taken out citizenship papers,
but has not been guilty of any acts hostile to the Allied cause. The Inter-Allied Repa-
ration Accounting Rules for German assets and the London Patent Accord permit
the exemption of the assets of Germans based on residence outside of Germany. 4"
Similarly the various neutral accords are directed at Germans in Germany with the
addition that Germans outside Germany who are repatriated may have their prop-
erty seized.46 A similar exemption is made in the Memorandum of Understanding
with Italy with respect to German assets.47 With respect to seizure of Italian, Bul-
garian, Hungarian, and Rumanian assets in Allied jurisdictions there is also an
'Section 32(a)(2)(C) and (D), 6z STAT. 785, 50 U. S. C. App. §32 (Supp. 1950). Congress
recently passed legislation requiring the Executive to seek in intercustodial agreements the protection
on a par with United States nationals of persecutees who had become permanent residents and citizens
of the United States before the effective date of any agreement. Condition 3, Pub. L. No. 857, 8st
Cong., 2d Sess., approved Sept. 28, 195o. For comparison of British and American practice, see Martin,
supra note 3, at 94-96; Cohn, German Enemy Property-III, 4 INT'L L. Q. 6o, 72-77 (1955).
"E.g., Italian Treaty, Art. 79.
"'E.g., Italian Treaty, Art. 78, par. 9(a).
"E.g., Hungarian Treaty, Art. 27; Rumanian Treaty, Art. 25.
"E.g., Allied-Swedish Accord, supra note 14, at 17 ("persons whose case merits exceptional treat-
ment") and id. at 22 ("proceeds of property found in Sweden which belong to victims of Nazi action
who have died without heirs"); Memorandum of Understanding with Italy, supra note 9, at 1 ("assets
of individuals deprived of life or substantially deprived of liberty").
The Swiss have heretofore not allowed an exception for persecutees under the Allied-Swiss Accord,
supra note 14. At the present time this Accord is not being implemented. It is hoped to take up this
isssue in the event of general discussions on outstanding problems.
' Rule 5(A)(2) of Rules of Accounting, supra note 32, exempts assets of "any individual who had
German nationality on 24 January 1946 and who on that date was physically inside Germany or had his
residence in Germany." London Patent Accord, supra note 39,
"See references in note 26, supra, to Allied-Swiss, Allied-Swedish, and Allied-Spanish Accords. The
Allied-Spanish Accord, however, embraces all Germans not resident in Spain or who are expelled from
Spain.
" 'Par. 2 of Memorandum, supra note 9.
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exemption for the property of nationals of those countries permitted to reside in
United Nations territory where the property was not subject to special restrictions
because of the owner's hostile attitude and potential danger to the Allied cause."
F. Enterprises in Enemy Territory
It is with respect to enterprises located in enemy countries that some of the
major difficulties have arisen. If the enterprise is merely a firm or individual pro-
prietorship doing business under some trade name, it is generally not given a nation-
ality independent of the nationality of its proprietor. Cases where this is put to the
test are apt to be rare. Thus, a case may show up of accounts receivable originating
before the war owing to a firm in Germany, where the firm owner left Germany as a
persecutee and has now become a citizen of an Allied country. In most cases indi-
vidual proprietorships in enemy territory are apt to be small, do a local business,
and be owned by an enemy national. More difficult is the case of partnerships which
are in some cases considered as having an independent juristic personality and thus
a national of the country under whose laws they have been organized, despite the
nationality of the partners. The general rule, however, independent of enemy prop-
erty matters, seems to be to ignore the partnership form and deal with the property
involved on the basis of the nationality of the partners 9 When we come to corpora-
tions organized under enemy laws, these have juristic personality and would for
ordinary purposes be considered as having the nationality of the country in which
they are organized. The harsh effect of such a conclusion has in some cases been
obviated by the doctrine that if the corporation is controlled by certain nationals it
should be considered as having their nationality. Further than this, however, in-
ternational law furnishes numerous instances where protection has been sought by
a country with respect to the property of such a corporation if in the corporation
there is a substantial ownership by citizens of that country. Generally this is based,
not on a negation that the corporation is a "national" of the offending country or of
a third country or of an enemy country, but on the ground of harm to the property
48 Art. 79, par. 6(c), Italian Treaty. Similar clauses are in the other treaties. The United States
suggested the language which was adopted and had in mind not to affect the property of all Italians
who were subject generally to some mild restrictions in the United States, but only the property of those
who were interned or more narrowly restricted because of their Fascist views and activities. See,
however, interpretation in Mann, Enemy Property and the Paris Peace Treaties, 64 L. Q. REv. 492,
507-508 (1948).
" EDWIN M. BORCHAND, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENs ABROAD 613-615 (I925); 2 C. C. HYo,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 9oo-90! (2d. ed. 1947); 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 827 (937).
Thus where legislation calls for the payment of debts out of vested assets to American nationals the
Office of Alien Property has made payment to an American partner in a foreign partnership. Mason
and Efron, Payment of American Creditors from Vested Assets, 9 FED. B. J. 233, 236 (1948).
Under the Brussels Intercustodial Agreement of December 5, 1947, discussed in III(G)(s) below,
firms and partnerships are lumped with corporations under the term "enterprise organized under the
laws" of another country. Annex, Arts. II, 2I. The text of the agreement is given in Maurer and
Simsarian, Agreement Relating to the Resolution of Conflicting Claims to German Enemy Assets, 18
DEP'T STATE BULL. 3, 6 (1948). No harm will be done by this lumping, except in a rare case of a
small partnership interest, as protection is accorded non-enemy interests by the Brussels Intercustodial
Agreement.
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interests of nationals of the protesting country. 0 It may be advisable thus to discuss
this type of case in the next part as involving property in which Allied nationals
have interests.5 '
G. Enterprises Outside Enemy Territory but Enemy Controlled
Paralleling the above cases of a firm, partnership, or corporation in enemy terri-
tory are the cases of enterprises outside enemy territory but controlled by enemy
individuals. Generally, enemy property custodians, who now uniformly look behind
the corporate or enterprise veil, would ascribe to these enterprises an enemy char-
acter." While the enemy property custodian of the corporate domicile may seize
the enemy stock without disturbing the non-enemy stock interests, for the custodian
of another state having jurisdiction over the property of the corporation the problem
of protecting the investment of the non-enemy stockholders is complicated by the fact
that such stockholders would have no interest in the property to be recognized as
a matter of municipal lawY3  In this respect the problem is very similar to that pre-
viously discussed involving corporations organized under enemy laws, and it will
be more profitable to consider this type of case also in the next part.
III
NoN-ENEMY INTERESS
This subdivision deals with the case of property belonging to or in the name of
an enemy, but with which there is involved property, rights, or interests of a non-
enemy which raise a question of protection. 4
A. Split Ownerships
The obvious kind of case which does not present much difficulty concerns a split
ownership dependent on the duration of the interest, such as a leasehold, a term for
years, a life estate, a remainder estate, a license right in a patent, a ship charter.
Where one of these belongs to a non-enemy and the residual proprietary interest be-
longs to an enemy, protection would generally be accorded to the non-enemy, al-
50 2 HYDE, op. dt. supra note 49, at 904, 905; BORCHARD, op. Cit. supra note 49, at 622; 5 HACKrorn,
op. cit. supra note 49, at 840. See interesting recent article, Jones, Claims on Behal/ ol Nationals Who
Are Shareholders in Foreigs Companies, 26 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 225 (x949).
" Just as it is possible to label a German citizen in Germany as a non-enemy (e.g., persecutee), it
should be possible to label a corporation in Germany owned by Americans, non-enemy. It should also
be possible to label a corporation partly owned by Americans and partly by Germans as partly enemy
and partly non-enemy. If this mode of reasoning were adopted, it would not be necessary to consider
the protection of non-enemy shareholders in the next part on the basis of their interests in the property
owned by an enemy.
2 Do KxE, op. dt. supra note 4, c. 9. To be completely logical, as far as vesting for reparations after
the war is concerned, if a country vests the property of a corporation organized outside of enemy terri-
tory as being enemy controlled, it should exempt the property of a corporation organized in enemy
territory, if non-enemy controlled. Countries have, however, pursued a policy of vesting in both cases,
as a hangover from dragnet blocking controls and as a way to maximize vested assets.
"'A country may allege that the corporation being organized in friendly territory is a non-enemy
national, but in view of the general practice of piercing the corporate veil, this is not apt to receive
much attention.
" Here, again, no attempt is being made to be exhaustive.
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though vesting procedures may sometimes permit the seizure of the complete title to
be followed later by according protection in compensation to the non-enemy. Similar
protection would appear warranted with regard to split ownerships such as tenancies
in common, joint tenancies, tenancies by the entirety, etc., where a non-enemy is
joined with an enemy in ownership. Here it should be proper and fair to divide
between non-enemy and enemy, although difficulties may arise as for example in
bank accounts where both parties have the power to draw out and expend the entire
account.55
B. Nominees, etc.
Cases will also exist where the non-enemy has employed an enemy as nominee,
agent, dummy, or cloak to hold the tide. Vesting countries have never hesitated to
look behind such fafades to seize property as being owned by an enemy and so
should reciprocally give protection to a non-enemy in this kind of case. 6
C. Trusts
Another kind of case is that of trusts in which the trustee may be an enemy while
the beneficiary may be a non-enemy, or vice versa, or different combinations of enemy
and non-enemy trustees and beneficiaries. It would be inappropriate to seize the
corpus of the estate if the trustee is an enemy, even though the property of a trust
is held in his name :57 protection should be afforded the non-enemy equitable in-
terest. Some difficulty may arise where the corpus of the trust is located in different
vesting jurisdictions and where there are mixed enemy and non-enemy beneficiaries,
since each custodian will want to vest the enemy equitable interest and to shift the
responsibility for discharging the obligation to the non-enemy beneficiary to another
jurisdiction. The fair solution would be for each custodian to vest the equitable
enemy interest and satisfy the equitable non-enemy interest in the ratio that the
assets in the jurisdiction bear to the assets everywhere. Another possibility is for
one of the two enemy property custodians to agree to release assets in his jurisdiction
to the other if that is the place of principal administration. This will serve for ease
of administration, protect the non-enemy interests, and perhaps will work out be-
" See e.g., Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U. S. 51 (1923).
" In this kind of case where a non-enemy acts as a facade, a question sometimes arises of protecting a
property interest he may have in the corpus belonging to the enemy national. Whether such protection
should be accorded would seem to be dependent on the guilt involved in acting as cloak or nominee.
See Bishop, supra note x, at 755"757.
In some cases the relationship involved is more comparable to a trustee, which is discussed in the next
subdivision C. In some cases the titleholder might be a corporation organized specially for this purpose, or
one already in existence which enters into the conspiracy of concealment.
It would appear to do violence to the intention of the treaties and agreements dealing with external
assets seizures to construe "property belonging to" or "property owned by" an enemy national to cover
cases where the enemy national holds the title as nominee, agent, dummy, etc. See Mann, German
External Assets, 24 BmRT. Y. B. INT'L L. 238, 252 (1947).
"'See, however, Mann, supra note 48, at 513. It seems proper as in note 56 supra not to construe
"belonging to" or "property owned by" as covering simple legal title.
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tween the two custodians from a money standpoint so that little loss is suffered.58
D. Decedents' Estates
Problems similar to those in trusts crop up in decedents' estates. In Anglo Saxon
jurisprudence, except for real estate which descends directly to heir or legatee, the
estate passes to the executor or administrator. A non-enemy heir to the real estate
or to specific personalty would appear to have a legal or equitable estate which
would be entitled to protection. Under continental law all property descends im-
mediately to the heirs or legatees, so that non-enemies would appear to have a legal
estate entitled to protection and the enemy a legal state which would be subject to
vesting." In so far as there are no bequests or devolutions of specific property in an
estate involving enemies and non-enemies, but general bequests or devolutions of
sums of money, say, the question arises here, as in a trust, as to which custodian shall
vest the enemy right and which shall satisfy the non-enemy right. The solutions
suggested above for trust cases would appear applicable hereY° However, it should
be noted that in the case of decedents' estates there is also apt to be involved the
matter of the protection of non-enemy creditors or the defeat of enemy creditors. It
will be more convenient to take up creditors' rights in subdivision F below.
E. Foreign Currency Cover Accounts
The case of foreign currency cover accounts taken out by a non-enemy through
an enemy bank presents interesting problems, which are more capable of simple
solution by international agreement or as a result of diplomatic intervention by
devices which are not restricted to the legal pattern of ownership rights under
municipal law. Suppose an American citizen requested a German owned bank in
the Netherlands or a bank organized under the laws of Germany to set up an
account for him in the amount of i,ooo British pounds. In some cases the bank
might cover this obligation by requesting a British bank to open an account on
"' Annex, Arts. 8 and 9 of the Brussels Intercustodial Agreement, supra note 49, provides for such a
solution in certain types of trust cases.
It is appreciated that the hypothetical in the text is a simple one and that trusts may be very complex
giving rise'to serious difficulties in weeding out the enemy from the non-enemy interests.
:' See Mann, supra note 48, at 514.
SThe kind of case under discussion is where a testator leaves $20,ooo to X, an enemy national, and
$20,ooo to Y, a non-enemy, and the testator's whole property consists of jewelry worth $x5,ooo located in
a safe deposit box in the United States and jewelry worth $25,000 located in a safe deposit box in
France. It would seem fair that the American custodian should be able to seize r/2 of the $S5,ooo as
enemy, releasing the other half to the non-enemy national Y. Or if it be assumed that the deceased
died domiciled in France the United States custodian could agree to the rule of release of assets to the
domiciliary administration, so that France would vest the complete enemy interest while releasing the
non-enemy interest. The United States custodian would hope that things might balance out by property
being released in some cases to the United States as the place of domiciliary administration. Subject
to certain exceptions, the solution of release to the domiciliary administration is the one set forth in
the Annex, Arts. 7 and 9 of Brussels Intercustodial Agreement; supra note 49. See Mason, Conflicting
Claims to German External Assets, 38 Gao. L. J. x7r, 178 (rg5o). A practically identical text on
trusts and decedents estates is contained in the United Kingdom-France Intercustodial Agreement of July
15, 1948, Treaty Series No. 74, CMD. 755r (1948), and the United Kingdom-Netherlands Intercustodial
Agreement of September 20, r949, Netherlands No. r (1949), CMo. 7803 (1949).
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itig books with a sub-designation in the name of the American citizen or with a
sub-designation by some special letter or number. In such a situation it could be
argued that the enemy bank is not the real owner of the account in the British bank
but merely a trustee for the non-enemy who has the equitable interest and who as in
the trust cases previously discussed would be entitled to protection. A more difficult
case is presented when the enemy bank covers its indebtedness to the American citi-
zen, not by the specially designated account described above, but by some "omnibus"
account in the British bank. This is an account which is in the amount of, say io,ooo
pounds and is designed by the enemy bank to cover not only the iooo pounds owing
to the American national but the pounds owing to all other individuals having
pound accounts with it.61 The omnibus account is merely described on the books of
the British bank as belonging to the enemy bank. It has been argued that the owner
of the account is the enemy bank and that therefore a custodian may vest it no matter
whether or not it is cover for non-enemy accounts. The non-enemies, the argument
goes further, have their rights against the enemy bank and have no specific interest
in the British cover account. The fault in this argument lies in the fact that it is
the banking practice to require the person opening the account in a foreign cur-
rency to take the risk of any loss that may occur. Thus, in the example given, if the
British custodian seized the account on the books of the British bank as being enemy
this would constitute a defense to any suit by the American citizen against the
German bank. In other words, the real loss by reason of the British custodian's
action would fall upon the American national. In this case, if it be considered
that the account in the British bank belongs to the enemy bank, the American citizen
is, as it were, an insurer against the suffering of any loss by the enemy bank and
should be considered as having a protectible interest in the account. The problem be-
comes quite similar to that which has concerned writers in the insurance field, that is,
whether an individual has such an interest in property as to permit insurance of it,
the courts generally striving to reach the conclusion that there is an "insurable" in-
terest where proximate loss would result from the happening of the insured-against
event 3
It should be pointed out that, under the letters of assurances entered into by the
United States Treasury with various European governments permitting them to
certify out non-enemy assets in the United States, permission was given to certify
out amounts in omnibus accounts in the United States of German owned banks
in their jurisdictions to the extent these accounts served as cover for non-enemy
nationals accounts, leaving, however, enough in such accounts to cover the obligation
"' This is an oversimplified picture, since the cover of the enemy banks for all its pound obligations
might be through several British banks, or intermediate non-British banks might be used, or the cover
might be in bond accounts rather than currency accounts. Further a bank might not cover all its
accounts ioo per cent but keep only 8o per cent cover. In so far as protection is accorded where there
is less than ioo per cent cover, it should be to the extent of the cover.
s' See Harnett and Thornton, Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-Economic Revaluation of a Legal
Concept, 48 CoL. L Rtv. xx62, passim (1948).
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to enemies. The matter of foreign currency cover accounts of enemies is covered in
the Brussels Intercustodial Agreement." The parties thereto not being able to
reach agreement on the location of the property interest in foreign currency cover
accounts of enemies decided to lump all kinds of enemy foreign currency accounts
and divide the proceeds of vesting equally between the two custodians concerned."
No specific provision was included covering foreign currency cover accounts of
non-enemy nationals, except that provision was made in the Brussels Intercustodial
Agreement that left their solution unprejudiced."
F. Creditors
The protection of non-enemy creditors of an enemy raises a series of problems.
In the simple case where there is enemy property in the jurisdiction with respect to
which a non-enemy creditor has some kind of lien, e.g., as a pledge or mortgage,
the lien would doubtless secure protection in most jurisdictions as a proprietary legal
interest.8 7 In the United States this protection is afforded to both American and other
non-enemy nationals.0 8
In the case of a decedents estate, having an enemy heir or legatee, there may be
a non-enemy creditor of the decedent or of the enemy heir or legatee. In the former
case the United States law appears to recognize that the title of the enemy heir or
legatee is subject to the non-enemy creditor's rights. Creditors would be recognized
during the period of administration who are American nationals or nationals of non-
enemy countries.P In the second case, of a creditor of the enemy heir or legatee,
the question appears to be of the general type involving any unsecured non-enemy
creditor of an enemy individual having property in the vesting jurisdiction.
In the case of such an unsecured creditor, the United States law permits an
American national,T0 but not a foreign national, to seek payment from these assets.
This can be explained as a concession to reduce the loss of American creditors who
may have relied on the assets of the enemy debtor in the jurisdiction in extending
the original credit. Also, in discriminating against foreign creditors it has the effect
6" Annex, Art. 5 of Agreement, supra note 49.
"SSee Mason, supra note 6o, at 177.
" Annex, last sentence of Art. is A of Agreement, supra note 49. This sentence left undetermined
whether the cover account was to be considered the property of the bank or the depositor. It should be
pointed out that the United Kingdom-France and United Kingdom-Netherlands Intereustodial Agree-
ments adopt the rule of releasing all cover accounts to the bank which requested the opening of the
account. Annex, Art. 5 of the Agreements, supra note 6o.
"See Macon and Efron, supra note 49, at 240. Part I, Art. 6A of the Paris Reparation Agreement,
supra note 12, speaks generally of liens and other "in rem" charges as being entitled to subtraction in
accounting for German assets. This is confirmed by Rule 16 B of the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency
Accounting Rules, supra note 32. Art. 26 E, Annex, Brussels Intercustodial Agreement supra note 49,
recognizes bona fide liens of non-enemy nationals which originated before blocking dates.
66 See Silesian American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U. S. 469 (1947).
69 Some few states may discriminate against foreign creditors. The Office of Alien Property would
generally not vest until creditors had been satisfied.
. " Sec. 34(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 6o STAT. 925-926 (1945), 50 U. S. C. App.
§34 (a) (Supp. 195o). There are also included residents in the United States since the beginning of the
war and by vay of special exception Philippine citizens.
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of maximizing the amount of reparations receivable by the vesting jurisdiction, rele-
gating the non-enemy foreign creditor to the assets in his jurisdiction for satisfaction
of his debt. Even if no assets exist in the other jurisdiction, the debt will doubtless
continue unimpaired,7 ' and recourse may be had by the foreign creditor against the
debtor himself at his domicil in the enemy state, although one disadvantage of this
is that the creditor may have to be satisfied with an inferior and non-convertible
currency. Of course cases may exist where the property in one vesting jurisdiction is
the only property of the debtor and the probability of the debtor acquiring any more
property is so remote that the vesting of the property in that jurisdiction and the
barring of a foreign creditor's claim will result in economic loss. This seems a
non-proximate effect for which no special provision need be made.72
Thus far we have been discussing the situation of a non-enemy creditor of an
individual enemy debtor. In the case of creditor of a corporation organized in
the jurisdiction which is owned wholly or partly by the enemy, the normal practice
of enemy property custodians is to vest the enemy .owned shares of the corporation
and permit the corporation to pay off any non-enemy creditors, local or foreign.P
In the case of the creditor of a corporation organized in non-enemy territory but
owned or controlled by enemies, or in the case of a creditor of a corporation organized
under enemy laws, the United States Trading with the Enemy Act permits satis-
faction from assets here of the debts of American creditors only, and does not permit
satisfaction of foreign creditors.74 The arguments for this practice which are put
forth in the case of the individual enemy debtor apply here, namely, that the
national of the vesting jurisdiction has relied on the assets here in extending credit,
and the foreign creditor can seek out assets in his own jurisdiction or in any event
can seek satisfaction in the jurisdiction of the corporation's organization. It can be
argued that only in the event that the seizure of the assets is of such importance in
comparison with the global assets of the corporation as to cause the bankruptcy or
insolvency of the corporation, has the foreign creditor been really harmed. In the
case of liquidation because of insolvency this will mean a permanent inability to
secure satisfaction of the indebtedness. If the corporation continues operation, though
technically insolvent, there is some possibility of course that future earnings will
enable satisfaction of the obligation."m
" The Peace Treaties heretofore have continued obligations by enemy nationals to non-enemy
creditors. E.g., Italian Treaty, Art. 81.
" Part I, Art. 6A of the Paris Reparation Agreement, supra note 12, permits payment for accounting
purposes to any non-enemy creditor of the particular German debtor from the assets of the debtor in a
country's jurisdiction. By rule x8 of the Accounting Rules, supra, note 32, this was restricted to creditors
of the jurisdiction.
" One of the bitter complaints made against the U.S.S.R. was its refusal to recognize the liabilities
of enterprises which it took over in the Eastern Zone of Austria. See Mosely, supra note 7, at 232.
,' See note 70, supra.
"Hyde states -that the United States would probably not be reluctant to seek the protection of
American bondholders or stockholders in a foreign corporation if a foreign government were irreparably
injuring their interests. 2 HYaE, op. cit. supra note 49, at 9o6. It has been noted that there is a
tendency to protect ownership interests and overlook creditor interests. Rubin, Nationalization and Com-
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It should be pointed out that even where a jurisdiction may be prepared to
recognize the interest of the foreign creditor in assets, it may prefer to do so by agree-
ment assuring reciprocal treatment and a fair application of assets everywhere to
the indebtedness.7" Another complexity is introduced when non-enemy shareholders
as well as creditors are involved. This is considered in G 4 below.
G. Shareholders
One of the major problems in the field of protection of non-enemy individuals
arises from shareholdings in corporations which are organized under enemy law or
are enemy controlled.7 7  These shareholders may find they have suffered a real loss
by vesting of the assets of the corporation as being enemy, and their loss would be
almost irremediable without diplomatic intervention since they cannot plead under
the municipal custodian laws that type of direct ownership interest in the property
which under those laws would qualify them to assert a claim based on title to the
property. In this instance, particularly, international law devices for protection of
interests may well cut across accepted doctrines of corporate law in order to prevent
a real injury.
One situation may be distinguished at the outset. When a corporation is organ-
ized under the laws of a vesting jurisdiction, even though there is a controlling
enemy share interest, the enemy property custodian normally only seizes the enemy
shares and leaves untouched the non-enemy shares. But when the corporation is
organized in a foreign jurisdiction and is enemy controlled, the practice of custodians
pensation: A Comparative Approach, 17 U. OF Cm. L. REa. 458, 472 (95o). This may be explained in
part because harm to creditors is often of a contingent nature. See also on creditor protection, Jones,
supra note 50, at 246-247, 252, 257.
Umpire Parker in the United States-German Mixed Claims Commission did not hesitate to interpret
that section 5 of the Treaty of Berlin called for the protection of bondholders of German corporations
having property which was lost or damaged. CONSOLIDATED EDITON OF DECisIONS AND OPINIONS, 1925-
1926 324-325 (1928):
"Through the much-misunderstood clause of section 5 dealing with claims of American nationals for
'loss, damage, or injury to their persons or property, directly or indirectly, whether through the ownership
of shares of stock in German, Austro-Hungarian, American, or other corporations, or in consequence of
hostilities or of any operations of war, or otherwise,' provision was made for the protection of all interests
of American nationals in both domestic and foreign corporations, where such American nationals had
indirectly suffered damage through the ownership of shares of stock in such corporations, or of bonds
thereof, or otherwise." (Emphasis supplied.)
In the American Mexican Claims Commission Report a case is given of American nationals having a
28 per cent bond and a 50 per cent stock interest in a Mexican corporation whose entire property was
seized by the Mexican Government. Since the property seized was worth less than the outstanding bonds
the claimants were held entitled to 28 per cent of the value of the property seized, but received nothing
by reason of their share interest. REPORT TO SEc'y OF STATE, AMERICAN MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSIOV
546 (1948). It should be noted that the statute under which the claim was allowed followed the
language of prior conventions between the United States and Mexico.
"'The Brussels Intercustodial Agreement, supra note 49, in Annex Parts III and IV assures such
reciprocal treatment and the sharing of the burden of meeting indebtedness by the countries involved.
See Mason, supra note 6o, at 18i-x82. The term "interest" in Parts III and IV was meant to be broad
enough to include a creditor interest.
The following discussion on corporations is applicable to firms or partnerships, which contrary to
the view put forward in Part H F and G, are assimilated to juristic personalities and treated as enemy
by vesting jurisdictions.
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has been to seize and retain the entire assets of such corporation organized in their
jurisdiction and it is this action which causes loss to the innocent non-enemy share-
holder.
The vesting of all assets of enemy controlled corporations and corporations or-
ganized in enemy territory has been influenced by blocking controls to which these
corporations were justifiably subject. The attitude has been sometimes justified on
the basis of the supposed guilt of non-enemy nationals in associating as stockholders
with enemy-to-be shareholders or just for investing as shareholders in corporations in
enemy-to-be countries. Of course this justification is true only when it can be shown
that the interests of the non-enemy shareholders were integral parts of a general
scheme to cloak the existence of the enemy interests in contemplation of war, a
scheme deliberately made at a time when war was probable or overt. Or it is alleged
that the risk of war and of seizure as enemy is one of the risks a non-enemy corporate
shareholder assumes when he invests in a corporation. Neither of these arguments is
convincing and protection of these shareholders seems warranted.78
What are the international law precedents before World War II? Numerous
instances exist where protection has been sought for a country's shareholders in a
foreign corporation where some action against the property of that corporation has
been taken by a foreign government79 However under Article 29 7b of the Versailles
Treaty, the external assets belonging to German nationals or companies controlled
by them could be seized. But, despite this provision, in several instances Allied
countries took action according protection to property beneficially owned by Allied
shareholders" while several Allied countries made a general turn back of a good part
" Hyde, Protection by the United States of American-Owned Property in War-Stricken Areas, 46
COL. L. R v. 519, 521-522 and n. 8 (1946); Mason, supra note 6o, at 183-185; Cohn, supra note 23,
at 542-551, and especially n. 54; Jones, supra note 50, at 254.
" See references, supra note 5o. Kiesselbach, who was the German agent in the German American
Claims Commission, mentions the numerous conventions made by the United States for such protection.
KIESSELBACH, PROBLEMS OF THE GERMAN A.sERICAN CLAIMS COMMsISSION 75-76 (1930). One of these
conventions was with Mexico. It was paralleled by conventions made by Mexico with Great Britain,
France, Spain, Germany, and Italy which likewise protected shareholders of these countries. One
difference was that the United States convention called for protection of any "substantial" interest while
the European conventions required the interest to exceed 50 per cent of the total capital. A. H. FELLER,
Tsu MExICAN CLAIMS COasMSSoN 1923-34 117 (1935). In 1941 the United States concluded a further
convention with Mexico providing for Mexico to pay to the United States a lump sum amount. Con-
gress then enacted legislation setting up an American-Mexican Claims Commission which passed, inter
alia, on claims of American nationals for loss suffered to their property, including loss "suffered by
any foreign corporation, company, association or partnership in which such nationals have, or had, a
substantial and bona fide interest." See REPORT TO SEc'Y OF STATE, AMERICAN-MExICAN CLAIMS COM-
MIssION 8 (1948). As stated before, the statute followed the language of earlier conventions.
"' See references to certain instances in the dissenting opinion in the arbitration of the claim of the
Standard Oil Company to Certain Tankers, 8 BriT. Y. B. IN''L L. 156, 170 (1927). The arbitral
tribunal permitted certain tankers owned by a wholly owned German subsidiary of Standard Oil to be
turned over as reparations. Although literally correct if the principles of domestic corporate law were
meant to be involved, the decision expresses a very questionable view of the intent of the provisions of
the Treaty under discussion. In any event, the practice has been different after World War II, in
accordance with Resolution 3, Annex, Paris Reparation Agreement, supra note 12, which calls for the
exemption from reparation use of property of Allied nationals, whether "wholly owned or in the form
of a shareholding of more than 48 per cent." See also comment, Doman, Postwar Nationalization of
Foreign Property in Europe, 48 COL. L. REv. 1125, 1135 n. 31 (1948).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
of the assets, thus eliminating or reducing harm to non-enemy stockholdersy'
Further, Article 297e of the Versailles Treaty and the Treaty of Berlin, which ac-
corded the United States the rights of the Treaty of Versailles, incorporated the
principle of protection for non-enemy shareholders, direct or indirect, of corporations
organized in Germany with respect to corporate property damaged as a result of
wartime action. Thus regarding American stockholders in American or foreign
corporations whose property was destroyed, Umpire Parker of the United States-
Germany Mixed Claims Commission had this noteworthy statement to make
about the international law principal referred to under the Versailles Treaty:
American nationals who had an interest in property destroyed and who suffered through
its destruction, no matter in what capacity they suffered, whether directly or indirectly, are
protected to the extent of their interest. Thus construed, this clause of section 5 is in
harmony with the established policy of the American Government to look behind forms
and to the substance in discovering and protecting the interests of American nationals.
It did not.have the effect of broadening the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, but was a
declaration of a rule which the United States would have invoked in construing that
treaty in the absence of any such express provision.8 2 [Emphasis supplied.]
What is the situation with respect to the protection of non-enemy shareholders
as to World War II? It may be helpful to divide the subject into the following
sections.
i. German External Assets. As stated before, with respect to German external
assets the Allies are pursuing generally a policy of vesting all property in the
jurisdiction owned or controlled by German nationals, including as a German
national any enterprise organized under German law. The Potsdam Agreement
and the Paris Reparation Agreement which gave international sanction to seizures
do not purport to define what may or may not be seized, the Potsdam Agreement
merely speaking of "appropriate external assets""3 and the Paris Reparation Agree-
ment laying down a mandate that assets of a German enemy in the jurisdiction of a
signatory should be disposed of to preclude return to "German ownership or con-
trol."8  In both cases it was appreciated there was need of further clarification.
" Borchard, Introduction, to GAn-NGS, INTER1NATIONAL LAW AN) AmERICAN TREATMENT OF ALIEN
ENEmY PROPFRTY IX (1940).
S'CoNsOLIDAT.D F iTIoN OF DECiSIONS AND OPION, op. cit. supra note 75, at 325, and similar
statement, HYDE, suipra note 78, at 522; Cohn, supra note 5o, at 251-252. See also, Hanna, Nationality and
War Claims, 45 Cot.. L. Rv. 301, 327-328 (1945). The section 5 to which reference is made in the
text was set forth in the Joint Resolution of the United States Congress declaring the end of the war with
Germany and was also set forth and accepted by Germany in the Treaty of Berlin. The significant portion
of section 5 is included in note 75, .1pra.
Art. 29 7 b and Art. 297e of the Versailles Treaty may be considered as representative of the two
streams of precedents in the international field, one of seizure of property owned or controlled by
enemy nationals, the other of protection of non-enemy interests, there being a conflict and overlap in certain
cases. International agrcemcnts, such as the Brussels Intercustodial Agreement, supra note 49, confirm
the primacy of the principle of non-enemy protection in such cases.
ss See note 5, supra. Mosely describes as part of a "feverish compromise" the division of German
assets' supra note 7, at 229.
" See note 52, s"tpra.
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After the Potsdam Agreement the occupying powers in Germany passed Allied
Control Council Law No. 585 which vested every conceivable and arguable type of
German external asset and set up a German External Property Commission which
was designed to define what was the property to remain seized. On the breakup
of quadripartite government in Germany the GEPC became defunct. Under the
Paris Reparation Agreement, Part I, Article 6F, a Committee of Experts was created
which then discussed the question, inter alia, of the protection of friendly share-
holders. After the discussion they recommended the calling of a conference to write
a multilateral convention which would cover these and other subjects!'
(a) Intercustodial Agreements. A conference was called and this led eventually
to the Brussels Intercustodial Agreement of December 5, 1947 which has been signed
by the United States, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, and the Nether-
lands and which became effective January 24, 1951.P7 Part III and Part IV of the
Annex of this Agreement are important here. Part III concerns the case of property
in one Allied country (secondary country) belonging to an enterprise organized
under the laws of another Allied country (primary country), which enterprise is
German enemy controlled. Instead of seizing all the property of the enterprise,
provision is made for the secondary country to secure only that proportion of the
property in its jurisdiction corresponding to the enemy interest while the part
corresponding to the non-enemy interest is to enure to the benefit of such interest."
as 14 DEP'T STATE BuL.. 283 (1946).
s The Committee of Experts, while intercustodial discussions were taking place, formulated the
Rules of Accounting, supra note 32, which permit a country to release non-enemy direct or indirect
interests in German assets. See Rule 6 J and K and Rule 8 A.
8' Agreement, supra note 49. For discussion of Agreement see Mason, supra note 6o; Maurer and
Simsarian, supra note 49; DIDISHEI., LEs CONFLITS INTaRSEQUES-MEs (I.A.R.A. 1949); Mann, supra note
56, at 245-247; Cohen, German Enemy Properly, 3 INTI'L LAw Q. 39X, 396 (i95o). This Agreement'is
the first comprehensive multilateral agreement on the subject of conflicting claims to enemy assets. These
conflicting claims involve disputes between enemy property custodians of two Allied countries as to
which is entitled to seize certain property, as well as certain disputes between an alien property custodian
of one country and a non-enemy individual as to whether a certain property or interest should be con-
sidered as non-enemy. It is this latter kind of conflict which is relevant for this article.
The Agreement is open for accession to other members of the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency as
well as under certain circumstances to non-members of the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency (Art. 5).
The Agreement failed to go into effect earlier because of the lack of Congressional authorization.
This was given by Pub. L. No. 857, 81st Cong. 2d. Sess. (Sept. 28, 1950) which empowers the executive
branch to enter into and give effect to agreements on cohflicting claims to enemy property, provided such
agreement, inter alia, provides for the protection of American and other non-enemy interests. H. R. REP.
No. 2770, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., has instructive material on the background of the Agreement.
For entry into force of the Agreement and the related call for submission of claims, Dept State Press
Releases Nos. 92, 93, February 6, 1951. Press Release No. 92 erroneously gives February i, 195 r as the
effective date of the Agreement.
"8 The method by which this is to be done is generally by release of all the property by the secondary
country to the primary country, the primary country then to reimburse the secondary country to the
extent of the enemy interest in the released property. If release does take place, the non-enemy interests
are automatically protected. In case, in certain circumstances, the secondary country seizes its proportion of
the property corresponding to-the enemy interests, precautions have to be taken that the residue enure only
to the benefit of the non-enemy interest in the corporation, as returning it to the corporation will obviously
not be adequate since the non-enemy interests will not be the sole beneficiaries of such an action. For
'discussion of cases under Parts III and IV of the Brussels Intercustodial Agreement see Maurer and
Simsarian, Agreement to Resolve Conflicting Claims to-German Enemy Assets. Outside Germany, 42 Am.
J. INT'L L. 157-T62 (1948); Mason, supra note 6o, at 179-185.
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Part IV concerns property in an Allied country belonging to an enterprise organized
under the laws of Germany, in which enterprise there is a 25 per cent shareholding
of nationals of signatory countries."' In such a case the interests of the non-enemy
nationals in such property were to be protected to the extent of such interests. It
should be pointed out that the 25 per cent requirement was imposed not on the
basis of principle but as a concession to administrative practicality.
Other intercustodial agreements have been made between Allied governments
which are relevant. The French and the British who participated in the discussions
leading to the Brussels Intercustodial Agreement have thus far been unwilling to
sign it, but entered into a bilateral agreement whose terms duplicated in great
part the Brussels Intercustodial Agreement. This agreement contains a Part III
which covers the same subject as the Part III of the Brussels Intercustodial Agreement.
However, it permits seizure of the property by the secondary country where the enter-
prise in the primary country is German enemy controlled. The parties state they
recognize such seizure may be prejudicial to the non-enemy interests in the enterprise
but "express their willingness to enter into special agreements to mitigate the conse-
quences."' This Agreement does not contain a Part IV dealing with enterprises
organized under German law but the United Kingdom and France signed a con-
temporaneous declaration stating that each was willing to negotiate with other
governments an agreement for the protection of "substantial" interests of non-enemy
nationals in enterprises organized under German law with respect to "capital assets"
of such enterprises outside Germany.92 The Agreement and Declaration do not give
the same protection to non-enemy interests as does the Brussels Intercustodial Agree-
ment, although it is not known how the provisions of these documents have worked
out in practice. 3  The United Kingdom-Netherlands Intercustodial Agreement
has a Part III similar to the United Kingdom-France Part III but the Netherlands
" Annex, Arts. 21, 22. It will be noted that these articles are restricted to nationals as of 1939. The
United States delegation attempted but was unable to secure a broader coverage. Under Pub. L. No. 857 of
September 28, supra note 87, Congress authorized the executive in future agreements to seek protection for
those non-citizens who were permanent residents at the time of this legislation and had become citizens
at the time of the effective date of such agreement. Further, the Brussels Intercustodial Agreement does
not shut the door to diplomatic representations for meritorious cases not covered. See Mason, supra note
60, at 185.
"0 In addition to the United Kingdom-France and United Kingdom-Netherlands Agreements discussed
in the text, there appears to be a United Kingdom-Denmark Agreement which has not yet been
published.
There was also an intercustodial agreement of limited scope entered into by the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Canada in 1945, which has not yet been published. See Mason, Settling Inter.
custodian Claims to Vested Property, N. Y. Law Journal, May 23, 1950.
Several unpublished agreements have been made by the authorities in Germany with Allied countries
which provide, inter alia, for the release by those countries of rolling stock in their territories owned by
corporations in Germany in turn owned by Allied nationals.
"
1 Annex, Art. 14 of the Agreement, supra note 6o. There is at the end of Art. 14 an ambiguous
sentence that discussions on protection of non-enemy interests shall be without prejudice to Arts. 12 and
13(a) which deal with seizures.
11 See text of Declaration at end of United Kingdom-France Agreement, supra note 6o.
" The British had been unwilling to accept a definite commitment of protection in the Brussels
Intercustodial Agreement and this was one of the main reasons for their failure to participate therein.
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secured significantly strengthened provisions for the protection of non-enemy share
interests, so that the result may be the same as the Brussels Intercustodial Agreement
Part III. Thus the Agreement recognizes that seizures may be prejudicial to non-
enemy interests but goes on to state that a government shall only be entitled to the
enemy interests and that the Agreement shall be carried out in such a way as to
avoid harming non-enemy interests. 4  With respect to non-enemy interests, the
Agreement contains as its last provision, Article 26, which is almost identical in
wording with the United Kingdom-France Declaration, except that the Parties
affirm their willingness to negotiate with each other. The form of the Article
appears to make it more of a commitment than the Declaration.
(b) Neutral Accords. The general effect of the Allied-Swiss Accord, the Allied-
Swedish Accord, the Allied-Spanish Accord, as far as relevant here, is to permit the
seizure by the countries of property in their territory which is owned by corporations
organized under German law or by German controlled corporations. 5  However
the Swiss-Allied Accord has a special clause which provides for exemption of property
of enterprises organized under German law which are controlled by non-German
nationals, and even in the case where property is permitted to be seized, protection
shall be afforded to substantial interests of non-German nationals which would
otherwise be injured?' The particular language involved is subject to controversy
but it is considered that this clause requires protection for cases involving sub-
stantial non-enemy interests, say, 25 per cent or more. However, this and other
matters have been the subject of a tentative agreement between the United States
and Switzerland on confficting claims to German assets of July 19, 1949. This agree-
ment has not become effective and has not been published. It is understood that
the Swiss have reached agreements of an intercustodial nature, in a tentative or final
form, with Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. With
relation to Sweden and Spain no clause exists for the protection of non-enemy na-
tionals but provision was inserted that permitted these countries to extend protection
to their own nationals owning interests through foreign corporations and then to ex-
tend the same protection to nationals of other non-enemy countries. 7 This was de-
signed to supply an opening for later approaches to these countries for the protection
of such interests. The United States Government did in fact have discussions with
the Swedish custodian in 1948 which, however, did not materialize in any agreement.
Further discussions are plannedPs
"' Arts. 14, i9 of the Agreement, supra note 6o.
"' See references note 26, supra, plus Arts. I and II of Allied-Spanish Accord. The Swiss Accord covers
"property owned or controlled"; the Swedish Accord, "owned or controlled, directly or indirectly"; the
Spanish Accord covers property "belonging to." Some question may exist in the Spanish Accord about
the power to seize property indirectly owned and property controlled by the Germans.
" Annex, Article IV B, Allied-Swiss Accord, supra note 26.
'" Allied-Swedish Accord, supra note 26, at 17; Allied-Spanish Accord, supra note 26, at 53- These
provisions refer to protection of direct or indirect non-enemy interests, to the same extent as Swedish
(Spanish) nationals, on condition of reciprocity by the country of the non-enemy. Cf. Mann, supra
note 56, at 250.
"it is understood that the British and Swedish custodians have reached an agreement, but this
has not yet been published. It is also understood that the Netherlands and Sweden reached an agreement
November 14, 1950.
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(c) Agreement with Italy. The Memorandum of Understanding of the United
States, United Kingdom, and France with Italy dated August 14, 1947 provides
for the liquidation of assets in Italy belonging directly or indirectly to Germans in
Germany or organizations organized under German law. But there is a provision
exempting assets of such organizations to the extent that they are not "beneficially
German-owned."" Thus there is assured complete protection for indirect non-
enemy share interests.!'° This is consistent with Article 78, paragraph i, of the
Italian Treaty which calls for the restoration of all United Nations nationals' in-
terests'' in Italy, and especially paragraph 4 (b) which provides for the protection of
shareholdings, direct or indirect, of United Nations nationals in German entities
having property in Italy. 0 2
(d) Agreements with U.SS.R. Under the Potsdam Agreement and the Peace
Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Finland, the U.S.S.R. was entitled
to appropriate German external assets in these countries or, as further defined by the
Peace Treaties, German assets transferred by the Allied Control Council, Ger-
many.'0 3 An attempt was made by the Western Powers in the German External
Property Commission, a quadripartite agency in Germany, to define what the
U.S.S.R. was entitled to. One of the proposals made was that non-enemy direct or
indirect interests in these assets should be protected. The GEPC, as stated before,
became defunct with the collapse of quadripartite government in Germany and
this proposal came to nought. The U.S.S.R. has pursued a policy of securing the
transfer to itself from the satellite countries of the German assets, including therein
assets owned directly or indirectly by entities organized under German law, regard-
less of whether these entities were owned by non-enemy nationals. The Western
Powers have objected to this action by the U.SS.R. Thus the United States trans-
mitted a note to the U.S.S.R. stating: 10 4 "As a general principle, beneficial rights
of United Nations countries in any German assets are not to be transferred." The
objection can be supported by reference to the Armistice terms with the enemy
countries which provided for the restoration of United Nations nationals' interests; 10 5
" See paragraph 2 of Memorandum, supra note 9.
100 Mann, supra note 56, at 253, reaches a different conclusion, relying too heavily on the literalism
of the Standard Oil Company Tankers case, supra note 8o. The word "beneficially" was intended to
secure protection for non-enemy shareholders in German corporations and the Memorandum has been
implemented in that sense. See use of word "beneficial" in par. 4(b), Art. 78, Italian Treaty.
.0. It may be argued that this paragraph refers to "legal" interests. However, in international law
the concern of a shareholder with the safety of the corporate property is so clearly recognized as a pro.
tectible interest, that there is no real doubt that this paragraph should be applicd to cover the shareholder's
interest. Cf. use of "interests" in pars. 3 and 4 (b) of the same article.
... If the Memorandum did not exempt from seizure such non-enemy beneficially owned assets, the
illogical result would follow that a partly damaged building in Italy (owned by a German corporation,
in turn owned by American nationals) would be seized as a German asset and lost to the stockholders,
while the stockholders received compensation for the damaged part under par. 4(b).
.o See references notes 5 and 6, supra.
... The text of the note is given in 1,7 PP'T STATE BULL. 298 (1947). It is understood similar
notes were delivered by the French and British.
''E~g., par. 13 of Rumanian Armistice, is DEa'T STATr, BuxLr 289 (1944).
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Article XX and Annex II of the Potsdam Agreement which provide that the burden
of reparations should not fall on Allied nationals;... the provisions of the treaties
providing for the restoration and protection of United Nations nationals' interests,
direct and indirect; 10 7 as well as the point that the U.S.S.R. is entitled only to what
is transferred by the Allied Control Council, which has not acted. The dispute
remains one of the unsettled issues with the Soviet Government. In view of the
fact that the countries concerned transferred the assets without awaiting an ACC
order, it may be possible to pursue them for indemnity.
(e) London Patent Accord. In the field of German assets mention should be
made of the London Patent Accord of July 27, 194610s under which the Allied
countries which have seized German patents in their jurisdiction have agreed to
license them out on a non-exclusive, royalty free basis or to put the patents into the
public domain. However this obligation only pertains to patents which are ioo
per cent German owned. Where the patent is less than completely German owned,
the only compulsion is that, in so far as a country may act with respect to such
patents, it shall accord the same privileges to nationals of other countries.10 9 With
respect to patents belonging indirectly to non-enemy interests and with respect to
which action has not been taken under the London Patent Accord, provision exists
in the Brussels Intercustodial Agreement for handling them similarly to any other
kind of property." 0 This would mean that non-enemy interests would be protected.
2. Italian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Rumanian External Assets. These assets
are covered by almost identical articles in the Peace Treaties. These clauses permit,
subject to certain enumerated exceptions, the seizure and retention of the "property,
rights and interests" which "belong" to the enemy government and its nationals,""'
by the Allied countries in which the assets are. What is the disposition of the ex-
ternal property of corporations organized under enemy laws, but which are owned
wholly or in part by Allied shareholders? The detailed nature of the Article in each
of the Peace Treaties may be argued to show that the whole subject was meant to
be completely covered, leaving no room for further exceptions or qualifications." 2
... Paragraph 2 of the Annex states that this principle applies to property wholly or substantially
owned by Allied nationals; if the Allied interest is less than substantial, compensation is expected.
"' E.g., Art. 26, par. i and par. 4 (b) of the Hungarian Treaty which are identical with the pro-
visions in the Italian Treaty discussed in the text in c above and in notes sos and oz supra. See also
Mann, supra note 56, at 241-242. It should be pointed out that at one stage of the Austrian Treaty
discussions, representatives of the three Western Powers examined with the U.S.S.R., inter alia, the
direct and indirect non-enemy interests in properties in Eastern Austria but could not secure Russian
acceptance that beneficial interests of Allied nationals were to be excluded from appropriate German ex-
ternal assets under Potsdam.
'°'See text in 15 DaP'T STATE BULL. 300 (1946); Boskey, The Conference on German-Owned
Patents, x5 DEP'T Sr Aa BULL. 297 (1946).
... See Arts. i and 2.
..0 Annex, Art. z6 I of Agreement, supra note 49.
" See references notes 17, 19, supra.
... In this sense the problem may be claimed to be different from that of the construction of
"German assets" which the U.S.S.R. obtained in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania and the Allies obtained
in Italy, discussed in the text.
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On the other hand it can be argued thatthese very shareholders are protected under
the other clauses of the Treaties dealing with the restoration of the rights of Allied
nationals or compensation for any damage done to their property;113 that these
clauses should be integrated with the present clauses; and that the present clauses
merely confirm the right of the Allies to vest vis-a-vis the Italian Government, but
were not meant to and do not affect the ability of any Allied country vis-a-vis another
Allied country to make claims on behalf of citizens who may be the owners in whole
or part of the corporations organized in enemy territory. It does not seem inappro-
priate to say that the protection of such non-enemy nationals is not to be foreclosed
but the subject of further discussionsY 4
The special provision in the Italian Peace Treaty under which the U.S.S.R. is
entitled to Italian assets in the Balkans"15 leaves an uncertainty similar to, but not as
complete as, the clause giving the U.S.S.R. German assets. It is not as complete since
,there is the incorporation of the exceptions in Article 79. But there still remains the
question, discussed above with respect to Article 79, of how much of Article 78,
dealing with the protection of the United Nations nationals, is to be integrated with
it. Should external assets in the Balkans of corporations in Italy owned by United
Nations nationals be considered Italian assets for seizure by the U.S.S.R.?
3. Special Nationalization Agreements. In addition to special agreements on
enemy assets, many countries have made general nationalization claims settlements
with the eastern European countries and such settlements have contained provisions
which may cover the protection of the non-enemy interests in German assets11
The United States made an agreement with Yugoslavia,117 initialed an agreement
with Poland which never was put into effect,"" and has carried on discussions thus
far unsuccessfully with Czechoslovakia." 9 The British, French, and Swiss have each
made agreements with one or more of Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. 120 In
113 See notes 1or, 102, 107, supra, and corresponding text. In addition there is the clause which
exists in all the treaties, e.g., par. 9(a), Art. 78, Italian Treaty, defining as a United Nations national
all corporations treated as enemy by the enemy country. Are such corporations though owned wholly
by Allied shareholders subject to the seizure of assets which they hold outside of the enemy country?
It is also possible to make the argument that "belong" connotes beneficial ownership, just as it will
doubtless be interpreted to include "direct or indirect." See note 57, supra.
... This has been the attitude of the United States Government. Thus the United States has expressed
a willingness to release the beneficial interests of non-enemy nationals in eases involving Bulgarian,
Hungarian, and Rumanian external assets, if reciprocal treatment is accorded American nationals. Cases
have come up, involving United States and British nationals and assets in the United States and Great
Britain, which it is hoped may be settled by future negotiation.
111 Art. 74, Pt. A, par. 2(b).
x The nationalization laws often covered German assets. See generally, Doman, Postwar Nationaliza-
don of Foregn Property in Europe, 48 COL. L. RV. 1125 (r948); Doman, Compensation for Nationalised
Property in Postwar Europe, 3 INT'L. L. Q. 323 (950); Rubin, Nationalization and Compensation:
A Comparative Approach, 17 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 458 (195o).
" UNITED STATES-YUGOSLAVIA AGREEMENT REOARDING PECUNIARY CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
rrs NATIo.ALs OF JuLY i9, 1948, TI.A.S. 1803.
118 Dep't State Press Release No. 935 of December 27, 1946, 6 DEP'T STATE BULL. 28 (1947).
... The Czechs in 1946 gave a general assurance of compensation, 15 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1004
(1946). In 1949 a Czech delegation arrived to carry on discussions, but its chief defected on arrival and
assumed the status of a political refugee, so that negotiations were not undertaken.
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addition, Switzerland has made an agreement with Hungary.1 2' The United States-
Yugoslav Agreement provides for protection of direct or indirect interests of United
States nationals and was designed to cover assets seized in Yugoslavia belonging to
German organized corporations 22 Payment of such claims is to be made out of a 17
million dollar fund by the United States International Claims Commission, any resi-
due after the satisfaction of all claims to revert to Yugoslavia. In the United States-
Polish agreement provision was made for protection of United States interests in
assets in Poland owned through corporations organized under the laws of Germany
where the American interests constituted 51 per cent of the voting stock, or if less,
were "directed to the control of the enterprise, as evidenced by participation in the
management."'
It has not been possible to examine all the nationalization agreements but a
sampling appears to show protection of indirect interests apparently going through
even enemy intermediate corporations. 24
4. Extent of Protection of Shareholders and Creditors. One further problem
should be considered with respect to the protection of non-enemy shareholders.
What should be the extent of the protection? The simple rule that suggests itself
is to assure protection according to the proportion that the non-enemy shares bear
to the total shareholdings. This simple rule seems to have been generally adopted in
many situations. 20 However, on several occasions objection has been raised that
account must be taken of the creditor interest, since of course stockholders on a
liquidation are entitled to protection only after the payment of debts, so that payment
to them without regard to the obligations of the enterprise may give them a
windfall. 21 It is possible that a creditor may pursue such a stockholder as being
unjustly enriched. But the main obstacle has been the impracticality or difficulty
of taking into account the creditor factor, and instances of previous solutions in-
corporated in international agreements or in decisions of international arbitral tri-
2' See Doman, articles, note x16, supra.
121 Reported State Dep't in unclassified despatch 169 of August 28, z950 from Bern.
""
2 See Art. 2(C) of Agreement, supra note 117. The agreement speaks of "'property, and rights
and interests in and with respect to property" "indirectly" owned by United States nationals through
interests, direct or indirect, in non-United States juridical persons.
... Art. II B of Agreement, supra note 118.
"s' E.g., Art. I of the British-Czech Agreement on Nationalization Claims, Treaty Ser. No. 6o (1949),
CMD. 7797, states that the agreement applies to "property, rights and interests. . . . owned directly
or indirectly, in whole or in part, and whether legally or beneficially" by British nationals. Art. 2 of the
Swiss-Hungarian Agreement of June 27, 195o, referred to in note 121 supra, states that the Agreement
covers all property, rights, interests, and claims, belonging directly or indirectly to Swiss natural persons
or Swiss juridical persons, in which the controlling interest is owned by Swiss nationals.
.. FREnaucx K. NIESEN, INTERNATIONAL LAw APPLIED To RzcLAMATIONs 58-61 (933); 3 MAsRYOME
M. WmITFMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 1683 (1943); 2 HYDE, op. dt. supra note 49, at
903-904; see GREAT BRITAIN-MExicAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, FuRTHER DEclsIONs AND OPINIONS 203 (1933).
"" FELLER, op. cit. supra note 79, at 120-121; Kiesselbach, op. cit. supra note 79, at 118-120, 126.
The principles laid down for the United States-German Mixed Claims Commission included protection of
creditors. See note 75, supra.
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bunals seem to rest 27 on a strict share basis.1 8 One way may be to ignore creditor in-
terests unless the other assets of the corporation are inadequate to meet debts. If
they are adequate it is only the shareholder that should be protected as his equity
is being affected. If the shareholder has no equity, it would appear that only the
creditor should be compensated."' Another possibility, even if the enterprise is
solvent, is to make a paper liquidation and figure out the proportionate interests of
shareholders and creditors in any particular enemy assets.3 The problem is a
thorny one offering several solutions, none of which is completely satisfactory. The
problem was in the minds of those who worked out the Brussels Intercustodial
Agreement and interesting questions will doubtless arise in settling the cases under
this agreement.
H. Restitution
Although the general problem of restitution is treated elsewhere in this symposi-
um there are some special ramifications in connection with enemy external assets.
By the London Declaration of January 5, 1943 against Acts of Dispossession 13'
the Allies stated that they reserved their right to declare invalid acts of looting
practiced by the Germans in occupied territory by force, duress, or other more subtle
means. For those cases of looting where property was located in Germany at the
end of the war, there exist procedures for securing restitution directly from the three
Western Powers or by suit under the restitution laws applicable in the three western
zones'3 2 For cases where the property has remained outside of Germany and has
become the property of another non-enemy national, laws have been enacted in the
various occupied countries attempting generally to restitute to the original owners.1',
12 KIESSELACH, op. cit. supra note 79, at 126. Jones, supra note 50, at 246-247, 252, 257.
128 See e.g., REPoRT To SEc'Y OF STATE, AMERICAN-MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSIoN, op. Cit. stupra note
75, at 500, 523, 56o, 61o, 638, 649. In the case of a bank, one decision gave a recovery dependent
on the impairment of the share value (p. i29). See references notes 125-127, supra.
2 Id. at 546. See note 75, supra.
a See possible formula in Mason, supra note 6o, at 182, 181; for cases without creditor interests, see
Maurer and Simsarian, supra note 88, at 158-162.
... The text is set forth in UNITED STATES EcoNoMIC POLuCY TowARD GERMANY, DEP'T STATE Pus.
No. 2630, at 52.
Although this declaration applied to territory outside of Germany the Allies have also adopted as
their policy the restitution of property taken away from individuals in Germany; Military Government
Law 59 in the United States Zone and similar laws in the British and French Zones.
12 The three western zones have procedures for restitution of identifiable items to countries of
origin if it appears that they were acquired by Germans other than by "normal commercial transfer."
... See series of articles in 29, 3o and 31 J. COMP. LEG. AND INT'L L. (3rd Ser., Parts III and IV, 1947,
1948 and 1949) on Burma, Philippines. Greece, France, Denmrk, Norway, Ide of Jersey, Belgium,
Netherlands.
No such laws exist in the United States, but the common law might ordinarily be effective where
force or duress had been employed. However, in one case which came to the State Department's
attention, involving property in the United States where the court appeared to debar itself from
questioning an act of looting in Germany on the basis of the "act of state" doctrine, in the absence of a
clear expression of State Department. policy, the State Department communicated with the court
informing the court that it was this Government's policy to oppose Nazi looting and to permit the courts
to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials. The matter came up in the case of Bernstein v.
Holland-America Line. The letter is set forth in 2o DEP'T STATE Bu.L. 592 0949). The letter is also
referred to in 44 Am. J. INT'L L. 132, 183 (1950).
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Where the property remained outside of Germany but as the property of a German
national there arose the possibility that it might be seized as a German external
asset. The most dramatic instance of this occurred in the Austrian Treaty dis-
cussions where the U.S.S.R. engaged in a sharp controversy with the Western
Powers, refusing to recognize that looted assets do not fall within the scope of the
"appropriate German external assets" to which it was entitled under the Potsdam
Agreement." 4 In the United States under the Trading with the Enemy Act and
the certification letters of assurances regarding blocked assets, properties seized from
victims of Nazi persecution or in violation of the declaration against forced transfers
may be released to the original owners'3 5 Similarly in the Brussels Intercustodial
Agreement no country is required to recognize loot transactions in conflict with the
London Declaration'3 6
The matter of looted property involved in German external assets came up in the
drafting of the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency Accounting Rules. It was finally
agreed that a country need not account for property as an enemy asset if it had been
originally looted,"3 7 thus leaving any particular country in a position to make resti-
tution without being prejudiced accountingwise. During the course of the discus-
sion the Netherlands, supported by other occupied countries, insisted that lootings
which had taken place through the indirect means of forced loans, removing foreign
exchange barriers, excessive occupation costs, and unbalanced clearings imposed by
the Germans must be considered on a par with lootings by ordinary force or duress.
This was generally agreed upon, however, without prejudice to the position that a
country might take with respect to property which has come from such a jurisdiction
to its own jurisdiction.' 3 s
IV
CONCLUSION
The reasons that vesting action has often brought harm to friends are several.
Thus, the domestic laws under which seizures have taken place are unusually broad
in their scope in order to deal with the many devices by which enemy interests may
be represented. Their functions as to enemy national and enemy property served
x Mosely, supra note 7, at 229-230.
"'Cf. generally sec. 32(a)(2) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 61 STAT. 754, 756 (s947), 50
U. S. C. App. §32(a)(2) (Supp. 1950). See Alk and Moskovitz, supra note 24, at 17-19; Cohn; supra
note 40, at 62-69, 75, and n. 83.
" Annex, Art. 27 of Agreement, supra note 49.
' Rules 1x-15 of Accounting Rules, supra note 32; Simsarian, supra note 32; at 229.
11' This reservation was included in the second paragraph of the Commentary on the Rules of
Accounting. This Commentary was also approved by the Assembly of IARA on November 21, 1947.
Both Rules and Commentary may be found in document IARA/A.S./ Doc. 354 of November i8, 1947.
The countries were fearful that on the Dutch theory all purchases from the Netherlands during the
war might be involved and that excessive claims might be made for restitution of goods which had
left the Netherlands and had gone into Germany 'and other 'territories. There was'an argument, 'too,
that this kind of looting by government of government might more. properly be made a governmental
claim for consideration in any peace settlement. The situation might have one more element of difficulty
if the property had come into the hands of a non-enemy national.
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well in the era of economic warfare when blocking controls had to be extensive.
But their strict application after the cessation of hostilities, when there is time for
separating friend from foe or using various devices (legislative amendments, inter-
national agreements, etc.) to prevent loss to non-enemy interests, would seem in-
appropriate. Part of the fault lies, not so much in the lack of refinement of legisla-
tion, but in the complexity and richness of the modern system of interests in property
which resists and overflows the categories described by legislation. With relation to
international treaties and agreements, the impact is also apt to be harsh since
the treatie and agreements often use broad terms or only lay down broad policies.
This may result from a lack of time for detailed analysis, from difficult bargaining
and-.ompromise which show up in the ambiguity of language and intention, or
because parties consider the formulation to be only an interim one, to be supple-
mented by further agreements later on. Further there is a tendency of governments
to maximize reparations by vesting on any plausible ground, ignoring the harm to
bon-enemies unless their own citizdns are apt to be affected in similar cases in other
countries, and to shift to other jurisdictions, if possible, the duty of remedying the
loss iniolved. In some cases, too, the content of protectible interests, in law
-has been too rigidly restricted and has not taken into account the fact of loss
to the persons concerned.
The goal 'of policy in the present field should be, colloquially speaking, to de-
termine who are really non-enemies and to exempt from seizure property, rights, or
interests- which *are really theirs. ' s In labeling what is a property, right, or interest
for this purpose the legal conclusions should approximate the economic reality: will
the seizure result in economic loss to the non-enemy? The law may attach the limi-
tation that the loss should be proximate and substantial. Legitimate government
policy may restrict protection to the range of administrative practicality and make it
subject to conditions of reciprocity and equal sharing of burdens among the countries
concerned. But these should be about all the qualifications to the principle of pro-
tection and these qualifications should not be used to emasculate the principle that
non-enemies should not suffer loss from the seizure of enemy property.
For the future, in areas not yet filled, the need is for laws and international
agreements which better effectuate the policy of protection. This may, however, as
in the past, be a counsel of perfection which ignores the hurly-burly struggle often
involved in the adoption of internal legislation and international agreement, when the
outcome is not the same as what might be produced in Olympian detachment. For
a good part of the enemy external assets field there already are basic texts. It rests
with governments of good will not to stick on the letter but to interpret liberally or to
agree to modification of letter to conform with the principle of protection. In some
cases, the matter may become one for international arbitral or judicial cognizance.
It will often then be for the tribunal concerned to engage in that form of judicial
legislation which fills in interstices and harmonizes a discordant text. The principle
of non-enemy protection should serve as a guiding beacon in this labor.
ISSMarin, supra note 3, at go; Cohn, supra note 23, at 542-551 and n. 54; Jones, supra note 50, at
254.
